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THE LATENT INFLUENCE OF EQUIlY IN
WYOMING v. COLORADO (1922)
James E. Sherow
Department ofHistory, Southwest Texas State University
San Marcos, TX 78666
Abstract. Clearly, the doctrine ofprior appropriation played an integralpart in
Justice Willis Van Devanter's decision in Wyoming v. Colorado (1922). Not so
clear was thepervasive influence ofequity in thejustice's opinion. In many ways,
Van Devanter's thinking is in keeping with the historical unfoldingofthe United
States Supreme Court's use ofequity to resolve interstate water conflicts.
As most people who have ever looked at a map of the West quickly
realize, the state of Colorado harbors the headwaters and major portions of
thewatersheds offour major regional rivers: the Platte, the Arkansas, the Rio
Grande, and the Colorado. Consequently, any water development in Colo-
rado will naturally affect the stream flow into any of its neighboring states.
Since the people in the bordering states also want to use these interstate
stream flows for their own economic growth, this situation has long caused
contention between Coloradans and their neighbors in those states.
In 1922 the United States Supreme Court attempted the resolution of
an interstate river dispute between Colorado and Wyoming. Justice Willis
Van Devanter's decision for the Court seemed to affirm the application of
prior appropriation, "first in time, first in right," regardless of state bound-
aries. While the prior appropriation doctrine formed an important part of
Justice Van Devanter's opinion, the role of equity in his thinking deserves
more attention. Equity "involves little more than a weighing of the compara-
tive reasonableness of possible uses of the water in competing states" (Leshy
1990, 10). Indeed, one can argue equity governed the wyoming v. Colorado
decision while considering the states' relative prior appropriation rights.
Equity and prior appropriation are not mutually exclusive doctrines, as
revealed in the justice's opinion. Similarities exist in Van Devanter's logical
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development ofequity, injustice David Brewer's Kansas v. Colorado decision
of 1907, and in such later landmark cases as Nebraska v. WYoming (1945) and
C%radov.NewMexico (1982) and (1984). Justice Van Devanterhad cleverly
weighed existing irrigation practices and the initiation of new ventures. His
reasoning resulted in an affirmation of the prior appropriation doctrine, the
rewarding ofirrigation in Wyoming at the expense ofColorado interests, and
the application ofequity as set forth in Kansas v. Colorado (1907). Nonethe-
less, while the justice's opinion seemed to favor Wyoming, it still allowed
Coloradans to protect their interests in ways unanticipated by people in
Wyoming.
Setting of and Precursors to the Case
Around 1900 irrigators in southern Wyoming began noticing Colora-
dans' uses ofthe Laramie River. In the north-central part ofColorado several
small creeks join to form a stream cutting a narrow alpine valley. When
irrigated the hay meadows provided Coloradans excellent grazing for their
stock, but yielded little opportunity for agriculture. The water course contin-
ues north into Wyoming for about 50 miles and then swings to the east
through the Laramie Mountains before crossing the plains where irrigation
crusaders built the Wheatland project (Fig. 1). Other reclamationists in
Colorado also wanted the water of the Laramie, but they wanted to divert
flows out of the Laramie Valley and route them into the Cache la Poudre
River and then divert the flows onto the high plains near Greeley. The
promoters and farmers near Wheatland, Wyoming, could ill afford this
diversion of the Laramie River.
Even before the farmers and investors of the Wheatland project, others
in Wyoming had aired complaints to their attorney general about Colorado
water users. "It appears that our Colorado friends have almost robbed us of
Sand Creek," wrote James M. Hoge, a Wyoming rancher (Hoge 1902).
Coloradans were diverting the flows of this small tributary to the Laramie
River through the Divide Ditch, a canal crossing the Continental Divide, and
dumping the diversions into Sheep Creek, which flowed eastward and joined
the North Fork of the Cache la Poudre River. Hoge requested permission
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Figure 1. Location ofthe Laramie River, the Greeley-Poudre Irrigation and Wheatland
Districts, and the Laramie-Poudre tunnel. The map also locates cities and other rivers
of tangential importance to Wyoming v. Colorado.
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from the Wyoming State Engineer to make alterations to his reservoir system
to compensate for his losses in Sand Creek.
Hoge also wanted to enjoin his "friends" in Colorado from furtherwater
use. He took action against Colorado irrigators, and the decision of the
United States Circuit Court for Colorado inHogeetaL v. Eaton etal., 135 Fed.
411 (1905), recognized the equal standing of prior appropriation dates on
interstate streams. The Court ofAppeals, however, reversed this decision in
Eaton v. Hoge, 141 Fed. 64 (1905), holding in part that Hoge had not shown
that he had at least $2,000 in property at stake. If the small stream of Sand
Creek could stir local passions, clearly the specter of transmountain diver-
sions from the Laramie Valley to the Platte Valley in Colorado could, and did,
focus the attention of farmers all along the Laramie River in Wyoming.
Douglas A Preston, the Wyoming attorney general, would not have
considered prosecuting a costly suit of original jurisdiction in the United
States Supreme Court had the complaining about Colorado irrigators been
limited to small farmers like Hoge. A more substantive issue was needed, and
the promoters of the Wheatland tract supplied exactly the stimulus the
attorney general required. In 1883 surveyors completed the initial mapping
of the Wheatland project, and the real work of developing it began in 1883.
The 50,000 acre Wheatland tract was a Carey Act development, with Senator
Joseph M. Carey and his son involved as company officers. By 1910 the
owners had constructed a large storage reservoir on the Laramie River and
had opened two additional tracts ofland for irrigation (J.A Johnston 1916,
58-75; M.R. Johnston 1916,57-58).
The investors needed an undiminished flow of the Laramie River to
supply their venture, and they became worried about the effects of a project
in the upper reaches of the Laramie Basin in Colorado. The people of the
Greeley-Poudre Irrigation District needed additional water in the Cache la
Poudre River to irrigate their tract of 125,000 acres of land northeast of
Greeley. A tunnel, a few miles in length, through the Laramie Mountains
could divert Laramie River flows into the Cache la Poudre River, and this
supplement would then supply the additional water needed by the district
(Link 1916, 520-48, 559-60, 930-4; Akin 1916, 548-59).
Equity in Water Law
The Kansas-Colorado Case as Precursor
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The plan to divert about 100,000 acre feet of water from the Laramie
River into the Cache la Poudre scared the Wheatland tract investors, and they
made full use of their political power to stop Coloradans from pursuing their
plans. As early as 1904, they had made perfectly clear their displeasure with
Coloradans' attitudes toward water use. Senators Carey and Francis E.
Warren, the Wyoming state engineer Clarence T. Johnston, Wyoming water
lawyers, irrigation investors in the Wheatland project, the attorney of the
Wyoming Development Company, and others appeared as witnesses for the
United States government during the testimony taken for Kansas v. Colorado
(1907). Each objected to Colorado's claim to sovereigncontrol over thewater
originating within its boundaries and to the tunnel project connecting the
Laramie to the Cache la Poudre basin. The witnesses all made special
reference to the adverse effects of Coloradans' plans on the development of
theWheatland project (Carey 1905, 1324-34;Warren 1905, 1289-94; Johnston
1905,1059-61).
During the testimony, the Wyoming witnesses advocated a mutual
recognition by the states ofprioritiesalong interstate streams. Justice Brewer,
however, formulated the doctrine ofequity in solving the difficult questions
before him. Since 1890 Kansans had been complaining about Coloradans
taking their water from the Arkansas River. In 1901, the State of Kansas
initiated the first United States Supreme Court suit of original jurisdiction
over interstate water issues. The suit became a massive undertaking with
millions of dollars in investments at risk in both states, as well as the future
operations of the Reclamation Service formed in 1902.
The case pitted two differing doctrines ofwater use: the prior appropria-
tion doctrine of Colorado and the riparian doctrine of Kansas. Prior appro-
priation in Colorado and in Wyoming recognized the right of their citizens to
use the publicly owned water of the states. First in time, first in right applied
in both, with the priority dates established by court decrees in Colorado and
by the state engineer in Wyoming. In both, the state engineer regulated
diversions from all streams according to the respective dates of the water
rights. The riparian doctrine ofKansas guaranteed to the owner ofland on the
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bank of a stream the right to his or her water undiminished in quantity and
unaffected in quality by any "unreasonable" use of the upstream flow by any
other person (Aiken 1988,38-44; Hutchins 1957,38-43).
In defining and employing equity, Justice Brewer sought to achieve two
basic goals. He wanted to limit the United States government's power to
control interstate streams, and he hoped to avoid declaring which doctrine,
prior appropriation or riparian rights, prevailed on interstate streams. As a
solution, Brewer devised equity, essentially an accounting procedure that
weighed the gains made byonestate's use ofwater against another's. Since the
gross economies of both states had shown growth, he awarded the more
energeticwater developers, in this case the Coloradans, the right to maintain
their use of river flow even if it meant some curtailment of economic
development in the Arkansas Valley in western Kansas. He excluded any
federal doctrinal control over unnavigable streams and left the individual
states to decide their own water doctrines. Finally, Brewer denied Colorado's
claim to complete sovereignty over the river within its own boundaries to the
exclusion ofany other state's interest in the same flow (Sherow 1990, 57). All
of these basic tenets ofequitywould figure in Justice Van Devanter's decision
in Wyomingv. Colorado.
States' Arguments in the Wyoming-Colorado Case
When Douglas Preston filed Wyoming's complaint in the United States
Supreme Court in 1911, he made three basic arguments. He opened by
establishing the water needs and uses of Wyoming irrigators. The people
living in the Laramie Basin in Wyoming had 325,000 acres of land in
irrigation. To produce crops on this acreage required more than the Laramie
River flow could normally provide. With demand exceeding supply the
attorney general could then assure the Court ofno wasted water in Wyoming
(Bill of Complaint 1916, 7-8).
Second, Preston argued that while irrigators in Wyoming could livewith
the shortage of water, they could not brook Coloradans' intention to take
water from the Laramie watershed by transferring it to the Cache la Poudre
Basin. Although Colorado uses of water within the Laramie watershed
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returned a majority of the diversions back into the river, water diverted out
of the basin returned nothing. The tunnel project guaranteed a reduction of
the river flow into Wyoming.lfirrigators were alreadyshort ofwater,then the
tunnel diversions would compound the Wyoming water shortage (Bill of
Complaint 1916,8-9).
Attorney General Preston concluded by advocating the mutual recog-
nition by the affected states of the prior appropriation dates ofwater users
along the Laramie River, an interstate stream (Bill ofComplaint 1916,9-10).
The logic was simple. If farmer A in Wyoming had a right dated 1870, and
farmer B in Colorado had a right dated 1872, then the Wyoming irrigator
would have hisjher right satisfied before the Coloradan could divert. This
contention denied Colorado's claim to absolute sovereignty over all of the
water originating within its boundary regardless of the effects on any down-
stream users in another state.
Fred Farrar, the Colorado attorney general, and the attorneys repre-
senting the Greeley-Poudre Irrigation District and the Laramie-Poudre
Reservoir and Irrigation Company (the contracting company building the
tunnel when the suit began) used their understanding of equity to argue
against Wyoming's right to complain. Little if any material harm, reasoned
these lawyers, would come to Wyoming irrigators as a result of the tunnel
project. Most of the river flow would be diverted to fill storage reservoirs in
winter, supposedly when the Wheatland tracts could not use the water.
Coloradans, they further claimed, applied water in more economic and
productive ways than did irrigators in Wyoming. The cold and high Laramie
Plains and to a lesser extent the Wheatland District could not compare to the
superior crop production found in the Cache la Poudre Valley. Besides, the
two Wheatland tract additions and their water rights postdated the initiation
of the tunnel project in 1902. The Larimer County district court of Colorado
followed normal state procedures and awarded the Greeley-Poudre Irriga-
tion District an August 2nd, 1902, priority for the tunnel. Consequently, the
recognition of interstate prior appropriation dates would not offer Wyoming
enterprises any relief from tunnel diversions. Moreover, and regardless of
Wyoming's claims otherwise, the Colorado attorneys believed the state
possessed sovereign control over all water originatingwithin the state bound-
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aries regardless ofany detrimental effects to any neighboring state. As far as
Colorado attorneys were concerned, the burden of conserving water fell
disproportionately upon the downstream state, and Wyoming irrigators had
not shown a proclivity to conserve (Colorado 1916,27-33).
Ofcourse, the Wyomingattorneys viewed Colorado arguments as a slap
in the face. At one point the attorney general facetiously summarized the
situation: "By what moral or legal right can the favored Colorado irrigator
throw upon his Wyoming neighbor, already handicapped by an 'arctic'
climate, and an irresponsive soil, the burden of spending useless sums to
conserve an imaginary or elusive surplus in the Laramie, which he so freely
wastes in the Poudre; and this in order to seize the cheaper and more
dependable supply already appropriated by [people in Wyoming]" (Plaintiff
1916,93). As Wyomingattorneysviewed thesuit, anyacceptanceofColorado's
position would seriously undermine their irrigators' enterprises.
Wyoming attorneys built their suit through the testimony of irrigators,
lawyers, developers, and particularly through the work of Ralph I. Meeker,
their expert engineer. Meeker had the task of measuring the flow of the
Laramie and then showing with precise measures how the normal flow could
not sustain the operations of the Wyoming systems. Given this argument, the
construction of the tunnel would further deplete the flow of the river and
destroy irrigation ventures in Wyoming.
Wyoming irrigatorswanted Coloradans to respect their priorappropria-
tion dates as if the state boundary did not exist. As the attorney general put
it: "The universal holding is that priority of appropriation gives priority of
right on interstate streams the same as on streams wholly within one state"
(Plaintiff 1916, 94). As part of the attorney general's overall strategy, he used
the testimony of irrigators, canal system engineers, and developers to estab-
lish the dates of all the irrigation projects in the Laramie Basin of Wyoming
and Colorado. Then the relative rights of irrigators in both states could be
established. Most importantly, Wyoming attorneys refused to recognize the
1902 Colorado priority of the tunnel and argued the tunnel appropriation
should date 1909, the year when the project actually began diverting water
into the Cache la Poudre River. Furthermore, ifappropriation rights were to
be honored as ifno state line existed, then Colorado could not assert complete
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sovereignty to water within its boundaries. As the attorney general of Wyo-
ming correctly noted, the court had already made its displeasure with the
Colorado position known in Kansas v. Colorado (1907) (Plaintiff 1916, 128).
The Wyoming attorney general did make one interpretative error. He
claimed: "In a contest for property of any kind we have never known a case
where it was held material that one ofthe parties could make better use ofthe
property involved than the other" (Plaintiff 1916,131). Nonetheless, Justice
Brewer had given such an opinion inKansas v. Colorado (1907). Even though
water diversions in Colorado had obviously injured irrigators in the western
portion of Kansas, Justice Brewer allowed this as part of the equitable
division ofwater existing between the two states in the early 19008. He made
this determination keeping in mind the higher returns of water uses in
Colorado than in Kansas (Sherow 1990, 57). Then, ifKansas v. Colorado were
to serve as a precedent in wyoming v. Colorado, the Wyoming attorney
general stood on shaky ground.
Colorado attorneys hoped to build their case on the principle of
equitable division as penned by Justice Brewer in Kansas v. Colorado (1907).
Injustice Brewer's decision, equitydid not necessitate an equal division ofthe
flow of an interstate river. Rather, equity meant the most efficient distribu-
tion of water to facilitate economic growth, or "ventures," in both states.
These lawyers fully understood this view ofequity and sought to use it against
Wyoming.
The attorney general and the counsel for the other two Colorado
companies had a three-point strategy. The first was to show how Colorado's
present and future uses of the Laramie River would constitute an equitable
division of the stream flow. Within this "most important" view ofequity, the
priority of uses in Colorado were to be contrasted to those in Wyoming to
illustrate how Coloradans took more pains to conserve, could make more
efficient use of, and could take greater economic gains from the Laramie
flows than their counterparts in Wyoming (Carpenter 1931; Colorado Attor-
ney General ca. 1913,5-13).
The Colorado attorneys based their arguments on the testimony of two
experts, Louis G. Carpenter, an engineering professor at Colorado State
Agricultural College and the main expert witness appearing for Colorado in
16 Great Plains Reseach Vol. 2 No.1, 1992
Kansas v. Colorado, and the state engineer, John E. Field. The techniques of
irrigation in both states were compared and contrasted, as were the crop
yields. What the Coloradans hoped to show was the greater economic return
of irrigation in Colorado. The witnesses portrayed wasteful uses ofwater in
Wyoming, which suggested that ifonly Wyoming irrigators took more care in
their practices, then no shortages would exist (Carpenter 1916,384-446; Field
1916,361-84).
In Colorado's final brief, the main arguments became clearly focused.
One cannot overemphasize Colorado's use ofequity in this suit. In fact, Fred
Farrar, the attorney general, insisted on avoiding any references to prior
appropriation dates of any Colorado enterprises. For him, the merits ofthe
suit did not rest on the mutual recognition by states ofappropriation dates on
interstate streams. What mattered was the higher economic returns of
irrigation in the Cache la Poudre Valley over those in the Laramie Plains or
in the Wheatland tracts. Therefore, Wyoming irrigators had no right to strip
Coloradans of their initiatives. Only under pressure from the attorneys
representing the Greeley-Poudre Irrigation District did the attorney general
bring prior appropriation dates into his arguments, and then only when
dating the tunnel, which he argued had an August 1902 priority (Carpenter
1931). This date placed the tunnel well ahead ofthe enlargements around the
Wheatland tract.
The whole issue rested with a correct interpretationofequity as defined
in Kansas v. Colorado. This is very apparent in the following telling quotation
from the final brief:
The defendants feel that priority of rights between users in
different states has no place in a suit between sovereign states
affecting the water of interstate streams, except possibly, that the
relative priorities might be one of the many factors from which the
court would determine the reasonableness of the use in one state as
against another, or, in otherwords, might be one factor in determin-
ing the equities between the states.
Equity in Water Law
We believe the decision of the court in the case of Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 is decisive of this contention (Defendants
1916,121).
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The implications of this position, though, worked against Colorado's
view of sovereignty over the water originating within its boundaries. If the
Court could determine the equities ofwater use between two states and ifthe
Court could redistribute the water between the two to correct any inequities,
then Colorado could not possibly retain sovereignty over its waters.
Besides the interests of Colorado and Wyoming, the Court heard from
the United States government. Federal officials basically played a minor role
in the suit since the attorneys simply wanted to preserve the doctrine of
"reserved rights." The successful prosecution of Colorado's notion ofsover-
eign rights would have certainly jeopardized the reserved right doctrine as
expressed in the Winters decision (Hundley 1978, 455-82; 1982, 17-42). The
federal government also wanted a decision establishing its right to any
unappropriated water in the Laramie River, which would establish a prece-
dent for reserved water rights attached to reclamation projects. Other than
these two concerns, the federal government had little interest in the merits of
the suit (United States 1917, i-vi).
Van Devanter's Decision
After the various parties had concluded their final arguments, the
responsibility for writing the opinion fell upon Justice Willis Van Devanter.
This development, which the Colorado attorneys had fully expected, boded ill
for the upstream state's interests. Justice Van Devanter, by any account,
lacked judicial impartiality. There was far more to his prejudice than simply
hailing from Wyoming and having served as a state and federal judge there.
He and Judge John W. Lacey, "Wyoming's leading council" during the suit,
had been former law partners in Cheyenne. In addition, Justice Van Devanter
and Judge Lacey were also brothers-in-law, and according to Delph Carpen-
ter, one of the Colorado attorneys, ''were known to entertain the most
intimate personal and family relations." Furthermore, Ralph Meeker, the
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consulting engineer for Wyoming, listened to the final arguments presented
before the Court and then remained in Washington, DC, "as the confidential
adviser of Van Devanter" in the areas ofhydrology and engineering (Carpen-
ter 1931).
The Colorado attorneys knew they could not do much aboutwhat surely
amounted to a conflict of interest. The problem for them lay in the writing of
the Kilnsas v. Colorado decision by Justice Brewer. Brewer was a former
Kansan, and he had written a decision in most respects favorable to Colorado
interests. Colorado attorneys entertained the notion of requesting that
someone else other than Justice Van Devanterwrite the opinion but felt such
a request "bad policy" in light ofthe precedent established by Justice Brewer.
So, from 1917 to 1922, a time which included three arguments before the
Court, the Colorado attorneys waited anxiously for the Court's opinion
(Carpenter 1931).
Justice Van Devanter's opinion clearly reflected the principles ofequity
as established in Kansas v. Colorado (1907). For some time historians and
legal scholars have distorted Justice Van Devanter's decision by interpreting
it as recognizing prior appropriation dates along interstate streams as if no
state boundary existed. The justice had simply used one prior appropriation
date in Colorado as the means to divide the stream flow of the Laramie River
between the two states in an equitable manner,and thereby denied Colorado's
contention ofsovereign control over its water by apportioning the Laramie
River flow between the two states.
When Justice Van Devanter's methods of determining an equitable
division of the Laramie River are analyzed, his role as an "amicable com-
pounder" is clear. An amicable compounder, according to Justice White, was
a jurist who adjusted "rights according to [hislher] conception of equity
wholly divested of any rule of law" (Loomis 1906, 58-60). Justice Van
Devanter approached his role as an amicable compounder in uyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 485-96 (1922) in the following manner. First, he deter-
mined the flow of the Laramie River based almost entirely upon Ralph
Meeker's findings. Then he calculated the available flow for the Laramie-
PoudreTunnel project and for all Wyoming appropriations along the Laramie
River to and including the Wheatland District at 288,000 acre feet. He came
Equity in Water Law
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JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER'S LEDGER OF EQUITY
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CO WY TOTAL
Annual Laramie River flow 310,250
Gross diversions predating 1909 22,250 272,500 294,750
Awarded to the Colorado tunnel
with an appropriation date
of 1909 15,500 15,500
Total after adjudication 37,750 272,500 310,250
Data are in acre-feet per year.
Source: Wyomingv. Colorado, 259 U. S. 485-96 (1922).
to this figure after deducting an average of 22,250 acre feet per year for the
gross diversions within Colorado. Next, he attached an appropriation date of
October 1909 to the Colorado tunnel, which conveniently postdated the
extensions to the Wheatland District. Then he totaled the diversions within
Wyoming predating October 1909 and came to a figure of 272,500 acre feet
per year. This amount constituted the Wyoming allotment, and the remain-
der, some 15,500 acre feet, the justice allotted to the tunnel project (Table I).
In his computations, then, only the water-right date for the tunnel played a
crucial role in the decision.
Notice Justice Van Devanter did not award any Wyoming irrigators the
right to divert water before the Greeley-Poudre Irrigation District could
through its tunnel. Rather, the Skyline Ditch could divert 18,000acre feet per
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year; the hay meadow farmers could divert 4,250 acre feet per year; and the
Greeley-Poudre Irrigation District could divert 15,500 acre feet per year
before Wyoming irrigators could count on receiving any flows from the
Laramie River. Priorappropriation, as ifstate boundarieswere absent,would
not govern the continued distribution of water between the states, and both
remained free to administer water rights according to the laws of each.
Interpretations ofVan Devanter's Division
Yet modern scholars have often read Justice Van Devanter's decision as
the recognition of prior appropriation dates along interstate rivers as if the
boundary between the states did not exist. The voluminous writings ofFrank
J. Trelease have greatly influenced the scholarship ofwestern water law. Of
Van Devanter's decision he wrote, "The rule of priority was adopted [by the
Court] for determining the equitable share of the two states in the river, but
it was put into effect in an unusualmanner" [emphasis added] (Trelease 1955,
1-2). Later, he openly recognized equity in the wyoming decision, but still
placed a heavier emphasis on the role of prior appropriation when he wrote
'''priority is equity' between two states that apply the law of prior appropria-
tion internally" (Trelease 1985,349).
Other scholars have followed Trelease's interpretation. M. Paul
Holsinger (1970, 53), a Van Devanter biographer, and Norris Hundley (1966,
177-80), a water historian, viewed Justice Van Devanter's opinion as a
recognition of prior appropriation rights along interstate streams as if no
state boundary existed. Even recently, scholars have missed the principle of
equity in Justice Van Devanter's opinion. A Dan Tarlock (1985, 395-96)
viewed the justice's decision as a "reliance on a modified doctrine of prior
appropriation." Anderson and others (1984,410-12) argued the Court dis-
tanced itself from Brewer's Kansas v. Colorado (1907), decision and in
following Van Devanter's lead ignored state boundaries in settling the
dispute between Colorado and Wyoming over the Laramie River flow.
This oversight of equity in Justice Van Devanter's decision has also
found its way into lawyers' arguments before the Supreme Court. The
attorneys for Nebraska employed the doctrine of interstate prior appropria-
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tion in their suit against Wyoming in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Tarlock
1985,399), and by New Mexican attorneys in their fight against Colorado over
the Vermejo River in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Tarlock 1985,404).
Interestingly, the court rejected the governing principle of interstate prior
appropriation in both suits and settled the issues using the doctrine ofequity.
Both Tarlock (1985, 399) and Trelease (1985, n. 349) have viewed
Justice William O. Douglas's decision in Nebraska v. Utyoming (1945), as a
marked departure from Justice Van Devanter's opinion in Utyoming v.
Colorado (1922). Still, similarities in the decisions exist. Both allowed prior-
ity to serve as a guiding principlewithin the broader notion ofequity and both
considered the availability of storage water in the contending states. Also,
both opinions considered the consumption rates ofwater in each state. And
as apparent in Justice Brewer's decision of Kansas v. Colorado (1907),
elements of cost-benefits analysis played a latent role with the Wyoming
Wheatland project interests coming out ahead. Clearly,while not denying the
importance ofpriority, equity formed a crucial part ofJustice Van Devanter's
thinking.
Strangely enough, while many modern historians have overlooked the
centrality ofequity, the public officials and private lawyers in both states who
were contemporary to the Utyoming v. Colorado (1922) decision all recog-
nized the key role equity played in Justice Van Devanter's decision. Certainly,
Carpenter, who argued the case for Colorado, believed the justice had based
his opinion on equity (Carpenter 1931). Both the state engineer ofWyoming
in 1923 and the attorney general in 1932 noted the application of equity in
Van Devanter's opinion (Wyoming State Engineer 1923, 42-7; Greenwood
1932). And in 1939, Michael Hinderlider, one of the more influential state
engineers of Colorado to hold office, believed equity was the governing
principle in the justice's opinion (Hinderlider 1939, 1826-27, 1836-38).
What of the United States' position in this suit? Justice Van Devanter
made short shrift ofany interest the US Attorney General's office had in the
case. The issues in the suit, the justice asserted in Utyomingv. Colorado, 259
U.S. 465 (1922), neither jeopardized any established diversions, nor did they
affect any public land holdings. Moreover, private irrigation interests had
already claimed all of the river leaving no unappropriated river flow for the
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federal government to claim (Hundley 1966,178). Consequently, the justice
saw no reason to entertain the United States' concerns.
Conclusions
Like the history of so many interstate water conflicts, Justice Van
Devanter's decision did not settle the dispute. As attorneys and engineers
from both states realized, he had miscalculated the amount ofwater needed
by the hay meadow farmers in Colorado by perhaps a factor of eight. These
irrigators often cheated by diverting more from the Laramie than Justice Van
Devanter's decree allowed, creating tensions in both states. Moreover, during
drought years the Wyoming irrigators often suffered while the Greeley-
Poudre District diverted its full entitlement into the tunnel. The execution of
Van Devanter's decree did not depend upon the appropriation date of the
tunnel, which postdated those of the Wyoming systems. Colorado, in accor-
dance with Van Devanter's decree, had a certain amount of water that the
state could take from the Laramie River. The state could administer the
diversion of this amount however and whenever it so desired. The tunnel
intake, located high in the Laramiewatershed, always had somewater flowing
by it, whereas in drought years river flows rapidly diminished on the Laramie
Plains and beyond (Hinderlider 1939, 1837; Breitenstein 1950, 1-3; Trelease
1955,4). Colorado irrigators, fully within the parameters of Van Devanter's
decision, made sure they took all of their water before allowing any flows to
reach Wyoming, drought or not.
Before these and other new problems were solved, the states would
engage in three more United States Supreme Court suits and sign a consent
decree in 1957. Wyomingv. Colorado, 260 U.S. 1 (1922), was a modification
of the initial decree. The next two decisions camein Wyomingv. Colorado, 286
U.S. 494 (1936), and Wyomingv. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940). On May 13,
1957, the United States Supreme Court entered the consent decree recogniz-
ing the stipulation agreed to by both the representatives of Colorado and
Wyoming on February 8,1957. The 1957 stipulation has effectively governed
diversions from the Laramie River since.
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None of these later Supreme Court decisions nor the decree interfered
with Justice Van Devanter's employment ofequity. Van Devanter had simply
taken equity as Justice Brewer defined it in Kansas v. Colorado and applied
an accounting procedure, albeit as an attempt to please Wyoming water
interests, to rectify the dispute. In the justice's opinion, equity took prece-
dence over the prior appropriation doctrine. In both Brewer's and Van
Devanter's opinions, the Court retained the power to determine an equitable
division ofwater between contending states while allowing the states the sole
right to administer the flows within their boundaries. Brewer and Van
Devanter both attempted to use equity to deny any federal control over any
nonnavigable interstate flows.
Scholars are beginning to notice the centrality of equity in interstate
water suits (Anderson 1984,405-29; Tarlock 1985,381-411). Thosewho think
prior appropriation governs interstate stream use and base their arguments
on Justice Van Devanter's decision in uyoming v. Colorado (1922), are
standing on shaky ground. In reality, the justice's opinion had affirmed the
Court's commitment to the use ofequity, which substantiates the viewofJohn
D. Leshy that "the innovative character, pervasiveness, and durability of the
principles of prior appropriation are exaggerated" (Leshy 1990, 5). The
doctrine, Leshy (1990, 10) argues when commenting on the apportionment
of interstate river flows for federal reclamation projects, has never been
paramount; "rather the controlling principle is 'equitable apportionment.'"
He concedes, as do I, that "priority of use is a factor, sometimes the most
important one," but this admission does not take away from equity, but rather
adds to it. And so it was in Justice Van Devanter's decision, which is an
indication of how the Court has used equity in conjunction with prior
appropriation in settling Western water disputes.
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